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Abstract
This paper examines the compliance behaviour of a dominant rm in an output quota
market when the rm is able to exercise market power in both the quota and the output
markets. Even in the absence of enforcement, under certain conditions the rm may
comply or even over-comply with its quota. The only unambiguous requirement is that
the rms initial quota endowment is strictly positive. Otherwise, the rm will always
cheat. These results appear robust to compliance or non-compliance in the competitive
fringe.
Keywords: ITQs; tradeable quotas; market power; non-compliance.
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1. Introduction
The basic e¢ ciency properties of a system of tradeable output quotas, such as ITQs (in-
dividual transferable quotas) in sheries, are well documented. These largely mirror the
basic properties of marketable emissions (pollution) permits, on which a considerable lit-
erature now exists. One essential di¤erence between output quotas and pollution permits,
of course, is that the former dene rights directly over production of a marketable good
or goods, which raises the possibility of rms being able to exercise market power directly
and simultaneously in both quota and output markets. This is an area, however, which
has received relatively little attention. In particular, there is the interesting possibility
that the ability to exercise market power in the output market may have an impact upon
a rms compliance behaviour in the quota market.
In the pollution permit literature, Misiolek and Elder [14] examine the simultaneous
exercise of market power in permit and output markets, but in their model permits and
output are not directly related, although the same rms participate in both markets and
pollution permits are, de facto, necessary in order to produce for a local market. In
this setting, Misiolek and Elder identify the possibility for what they term exclusionary
manipulationof pollution permits, whereby rms use permit market power in order to
raise rivalscosts or to deter new entrants. The welfare implications of the concurrent
exercise of market power in pollution permit and output markets have been examined
by Malueg [13], Innes, Kling and Rubin [10] and Sartzetakis [15, 16]. Like Misiolek and
Elder, all these authors assume the equivalence of permit demands and emission levels,
i.e., that there is perfect compliance and that rms do not hold more permits than is
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required by the regulator. Compliance by a dominant rm in a pollution permit market
is considered by Malik [12], extending the earlier work of Hahn [7] and van Egteren and
Weber [5] on permit market power. As well as exploring the e¤ects of cheating, Malik
identies the conditions under which a dominant rm will hold excess permits.
Despite the often expressed concerns of policy makers and industry, few studies have
examined the implications of either market power or non-compliance for ITQ markets,
however. Anderson [1] models the prot-maximising behaviour of a (compliant) shing
rm which has market power in both the quota market and the corresponding output
market. He nds that if the dominant rm is initially allocated all the quota, in exercising
monopoly power it will nd it protable to hold quota in excess of its level of production,
so increasing the output price. In the case where the dominant rm initially owns none
of the quota, he nds no incentive for the rm to acquire excess quota, a result which
he generalises to any rm with monopsony power in the quota market. In a recent
paper, Anderson [2] revises this conclusion, but does not go on to examine further the
conditions for the exercise of market power in both quota and output markets. Armstrong
[3] looks at market power and e¢ ciency in a dynamic quota allocation model, along the
lines of the pollution permit model in Hagem and Westskog [6], but focuses only on
market power in the quota market. To date, only two studies have analysed the impact of
non-compliance upon ITQ markets. Chavez and Salgado [4] follow the pollution permit
literature in assuming that rmsexpected penalties for non-compliance depend upon their
quota violations measured in level terms (e.g., Malik [11,12]), deriving similar results (for
example, non-compliance is found to always reduce quota demands). Hatcher [8] adopts a
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more general specication of the violation argument in the expected penalty function and
shows that the impact of non-compliance on rmsquota demands is less straightforward,
with the level violationmodel arguably being a special case.
The present paper examines both compliance and market power in an output quota mar-
ket. The basic model follows closely the pollution permit model of Malik [12], although the
notation follows Hatcher [8]. After establishing some preliminary results for a competitive
rm, we examine rstly the compliance behaviour of a rm with market dominance in the
quota market only and then consider a rm with market power in both quota and output
markets. Here, provided the dominant rms initial quota allocation is greater than zero,
the rm may choose to hold excess quota in relation to its output level, or it may cheat,
depending upon the relative capacities of the dominant rm and the competitive fringe
and the slopes of the (inverse) demand curves for quota and output. If the initial quota
allocation to the dominant rm is zero, on the other hand, it will unambiguously cheat,
although its quota demand may still be positive even in the absence of enforcement. After
a brief consideration of the impact of non-compliance in the competitive fringe, a nal
section contains some concluding remarks.
An appendix presents a rigorous examination of the impact of non-compliance on a com-
petitive rms quota demand when expected penalties are modelled as a function of rela-
tive, rather than level, violations. This expands on the analysis in Hatcher [8] and corrects
an error in that earlier paper.
5
2. Preliminaries
We consider an industry in which there are a large number of independently operated,
prot-maximising rms producing a single good. There is one dominant rm, indexed
i = 1, and a fringe of competitive rms which we represent, without loss of generality,
by a single price taking rm, indexed i = 2. For the fringe rm, we have the short run
(social) benet function
B2 (q2)  pq2   c2 (q2) ;
where q2 is output, p is the output price and c2 (q2) are variable costs. We assume c002 (q2) >
0, so thatB2 (q2) is strictly concave in output. The necessary condition for (unconstrained)
benet maximisation by the fringe rm is then, as usual, B02 (q

2)  p  c02 (q2) = 0:
In a given period, a social planner or resource manager sets a total output quota 
 for
the industry. Quota is freely (costlessly) traded between rms and each rm demands
an amount of quota Qi  0 at market equilibrium, where we assume the market clearing
condition Q1 + Q

2 = 
 holds. A compliant competitive rm, i.e., a rm which always
chooses Q2  q2 irrespective of any pecuniary incentive to do otherwise, then faces the
short run prot maximisation problem
max
q2;Q2
B2 (q2)  rQ2 s:t: q2  0; Q2  0; Q2  q2; (1)
where r is the short run (rental) price of quota.1 The corresponding Lagrangian
L = B2 (q2)  rQ2   2 (q2  Q2)
1 Note that the rms initial allocation of quota is assumed to be zero where the quota price is parametric to the
rm. In this case a non-zero initial quota allocation makes no di¤erence to the prot-maximising behaviour of
the rm.
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gives the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum
Lq = B02 (q2)  2  0; q2  0; Lqq2 = 0; (2a)
LQ =  r + 2  0; Q2  0; LQQ2 = 0; (2b)
L =  q2 +Q2  0; 2  0; L2 = 0: (2c)
For q2 = Q

2 > 0, we have the necessary rst-order conditions B
0
2 (q

2) = 2 and r = 2
and hence the usual decision rule for a compliant price taking rm in a quota market,
B02 (q

2) = r > 0: (3)
Here, the quota demand Q2 (r) of the rm at a quota price r is given by the inverse of
the marginal benet function B02 (q2) evaluated at r, i.e.,
Q2 (r) = q

2 (r)  B0 12 (r) ;
with the slope of the quota demand curve given by the slope of B0 12 (r):
dQ2 (r)
dr
=
dB0 12 (r)
dr
= B00 12 () 
1
B002 (q2)
;
by the inverse function rule.
While the quota price is parametric to the competitive rm, it is of course endogenous
to the industry as a whole. The fringe demand for quota at a price r is Q2 (r). If
Q2 (r) = 
 Q1 (the residual quota supply to the fringe) then r (
 Q1) is the market-
clearing (equilibrium) quota price. Given the concavity of B2 (q2), the fringe inverse
quota demand r (
 Q1) is decreasing in [
 Q1], taking a value of zero if [
 Q1] is
just equal to (or greater than) the unconstrained fringe output B0 12 (0). Equivalently,
dr () =dQ1 =  r0 () > 0.
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3. A dominant rm in the quota market
Consider, rst, a situation in which the dominant rm can exert market power in the quota
market but is a price taker in the output market (this might be the case, for example, if
other, separately regulated, industries produced an identical good for the same market).
Here, the (compliant) dominant rms short run prot maximisation problem is
max
q1;Q1
B1 (q1)  r (
 Q1)

Q1   Q1

s:t: q1  0; Q1  0; Q1  q1; (4)
where Q1  0 is the initial allocation of quota to the rm. The corresponding Lagrangian
is
L = B1 (q1)  r ()

Q1   Q1
  1 [q1  Q1]
and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimal solution are
Lq = B01 (q1)  1  0; q1  0; Lqq1 = 0; (5a)
LQ =  r () + r0 ()

Q1   Q1

+ 1  0; Q1  0; LQQ1 = 0; (5b)
L =  q1 +Q1  0; 1  0; L1 = 0: (5c)
For Q1 = q

1 > 0; we then have, solving for 

1,
B01 (q

1) = R1 (Q

1)  0; (6)
where R1 (Q1)  r ()   r0 ()

Q1   Q1

is the dominant rms marginal revenue from
selling quota if Q1 > Q1, or its marginal cost of purchasing quota if Q1 < Q

1. Given
r () > 0, r0 () < 0, expression (6) then implies
Q1 > Q1 ) R1 (Q1) > r; B01 (q1) > r;
Q1 = Q1 ) R1 (Q1) = r; B01 (q1) = r;
Q1 < Q1 ) R1 (Q1) < r; B01 (q1) < r;
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and we can therefore state
Result 1. (Hahn) Where the dominant rm is behaving as a monopolist in the quota
market (Q1 < Q1), we have B
0
1 (q

1) < r (), whereas if Q1 > Q1, we have B01 (q1) > r ().
Only in the case where Q1 = Q1 is the market equilibrium quota price the e¢ cient price,
where the marginal costs of production are equated across all rms. Otherwise, the quota
price faced by the competitive fringe is either too low, so that the competitive rms over-
produce relative to the dominant rm, or too high, so that the competitive rms under-
produce relative to the dominant rm.
This is the basic (static) e¢ ciency result found by Hahn [7] for the analogous case of a
market in pollution permits (see also van Egteren and Weber [5] and Malik [12]).
If the dominant rm nds it protable to demand quota in excess of its requirement for
legal production (Q1 > q

1 > 0), then from the complementary slackness condition in (5c)
we must have 1 = 0 so that
B01 (q

1) = R1 (Q

1)  r ()  r0 ()

Q1   Q1

= 0; (8)
which, given r () > 0 and r0 () < 0, requires Q1 < Q1. Thus we have
Result 2. (Malik) The dominant rm will only demand excess quota if it is initially over-
endowed with quota to the extent that its marginal revenue from selling quota is zero when
Q1 > q

1. Here, B
0
1 (q

1) = 0 implies that the dominant rms own output is unconstrained.
This is (expressed in slightly di¤erent form) equivalent to the result found by Malik [12]
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for a dominant rm in an emissions permit market. Note that, even if 
 were to exceed
the total unconstrained industry output, if the initial allocation of quota to the dominant
rm were large enough it could restrict the supply of quota to the competitive fringe and
hence restrict the total level of output.
We could also have a Q1 such that Q1 = q

1 is an unconstrained solution to (4), but for
any smaller Q1, the unconstrained rm will be non-compliant. Although a non-compliant
dominant rm may have a positive quota demand, we cannot have Q1 > Q1, i.e., the
rm will never be a net purchaser of quota. An unconstrained solution where Q1 = Q1 is
possible, but implies that r = 0, i.e., if (in the absence of enforcement) the non-compliant
rm demands only its initial quota allocation, then this must be such as to leave a residual
quota supply to the fringe which equals or exceeds its total capacity. Note that, again in
the absence of enforcement, Q1 = 0 unambiguously implies Q1 = 0.
Since, if we allow the rm to be non-compliant, we can in general say that it will cheat
wherever it has no incentive to hold excess quota, we have the obvious (and perhaps not
entirely trivial) corollary, as noted by Malik [12] in the context of pollution permits, that
it is possible for a dominant rm to be over-endowedwith quota such that it will not
violate.
If we assume that the rm is subject to enforcement of its quota compliance, however, we
can replace the constraint term in the Lagrangian function with an expected penalty term
1 (v1), where 1 (v1) is the product of a ne for a violation v1 and the rms (subjective)
probability of incurring that ne. We assume that at least one of these two quantities
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is a function of the size of the rms quota violation, dened in general terms as v1 
v1 (q1; Q1). For q1 > Q

1 > 0; we then have the rst order conditions
B01 (q

1) =
@1 (v1)
@q1
> 0 (9)
and
R1 (Q

1) =  
@1 (v1)
@Q1
> 0: (10)
Subtracting (10) from (9) and rearranging, we obtain the joint decision rule
B01 (q

1) = R1 (Q

1) +

@1 (v1)
@q1
+
@1 (v1)
@Q1

> 0: (11)
Notice that if the expected penalty is assumed to depend only upon the level violation
size (v1  q1 Q1), as is generally assumed in the pollution permit literature for example,
then @1 (v1) =@q1 =  @1 (v1) =@Q1 = 01 (v1) and hence we have
B01 (q

1) = R1 (Q

1)
as before, so that B01 (q

1) = r when Q

1 =
Q1, as in the case of a compliant rm. If, on
the other hand, the expected penalty depends upon the relative size of the violation, i.e.,
v1  [q1  Q1] =Q1 (or v1  q1=Q1),2 then in the rst order conditions we will have
@1 (v1)
@q1
= 01 (v1)
1
Q1
(12)
and
@1 (v1)
@Q1
=  01 (v1)
q1
Q21
; (13)
so that (10) becomes
B01 (q

1) = R1 (Q

1) + 
0
1 (v

1)

1
Q1
  q

1
Q21

> 0: (14)
2 see Hatcher [8, 9]
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Now, q1 > Q

1 implies that
0 < B01 (q

1) < R1 (Q

1) :
With a relative violation argument in the expected penalty function, we therefore have
Q1 > Q1 ) R1 (Q1) > r; B01 (q1) R r;
Q1 = Q1 ) R1 (Q1) = r; B01 (q1) < r;
Q1 < Q1 ) R1 (Q1) < r; B01 (q1) < r;
which leads us to
Result 3. When the dominant rm is non-compliant and subject to enforcement, Result
1 (Hahn) continues to hold if and only if the rms expected penalty depends upon its
violation expressed in level terms. If the rms expectation of a penalty is a function of
its violation expressed in relative terms, then production can only be e¢ ciently allocated
if the non-compliant rm is a net purchaser of quota.
This result does, however, assume that the fringe is compliant, or, if non-compliant, has
expected penalties expressed as a function of level violations, so that B02 (q

2) = r. If, for
both the dominant rm and the fringe, expected penalties depended upon the relative
violation size, then we would have B02 (q

2) < r (see Appendix A) and hence production
could potentially be e¢ ciently allocated for any Q1 R Q1.
4. A dominant rm in both quota and output markets
Now consider a rm with market dominance in both the quota and output markets (this
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might arise in a situation where the entire output market is supplied by one industry
under quota regulation). The (compliant) dominant rms short run prot maximisation
problem can now be written as
max
q1;Q1
B1 (q1; p (q))  r (
 Q1; p (q))

Q1   Q1

(16)
s:t: q1  0; Q1  0; Q1  q1;
where q  q1+q2 is the combined output of the dominant rm and the competitive fringe
and p (q) is the inverse consumer demand for that output, with, we assume, p0 (q) < 0.
Note that changes in p (q) impact upon both B1 () as well as, indirectly through the e¤ect
on B02 (), the equilibrium quota price r ().
The corresponding Lagrangian and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum are
L = B1 (q1; p (q))  r (
 Q1; p (q))

Q1   Q1
  1 [q1  Q1]
with
Lq = @B1 ()
@q1
+
@B1 ()
@p (q)
p0 (q)
@q
@q1
  @r ()
@p (q)
p0 (q)
@q
@q1

Q1   Q1
  1  0;
q1  0; Lqq1 = 0; (17a)
LQ = @B1 ()
@p () p
0 (q)
@q
@Q1
  r ()  @r ()
@Q1

Q1   Q1
  @r ()
@p (q)
p0 (q)
@q
@Q1

Q1   Q1

+ 1  0;
Q1  0; LQQ1 = 0; (17b)
L =  q1 +Q1  0; 1  0; L1 = 0: (17c)
For Q1 = q

1 > 0, we then have
@B1 ()
@q1
+ p0 (q)
@q
@q1

q1  

Q1   Q1

= 1  0 (18)
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and
r () + @r ()
@Q1

Q1   Q1
  p0 (q) @q
@Q1

q1  

Q1   Q1

= 1  0; (19)
where we have used @B1 () =@p () = q1 and @r () =@p (q) = 1.3 Note that here @B1 () =@q1
and @r () =@Q1 are equivalent to B01 (q1) and  r0 () in the previous section.
Solving (18) and (19) for 1, we obtain the joint optimal decision rule
@B1 ()
@q1
+ p0 (q)

@q
@q1
+
@q
@Q1
 
q1  

Q1   Q1

= R1 (Q

1) ; (20)
where, as before, R1 (Q1)  r () +@r () =@Q

Q1   Q1

. The additional term on the LHS
of (20) captures the rms net marginal impact upon its revenues from output as well as
revenues from, or costs of, quota trade, through the e¤ect of its own output and quota
demand upon the total industry output q and hence the market price p (q).
In order to examine the dominant rms impact upon q, note rstly that
@q
@q1
=
@q1
@q1
+
@q2
@q1
= 1 +
@q2
@q1
;
where @q2=@q1 is the rms conjectural derivative for the output of the competitive fringe
in relation to its own output. If the output of the fringe is constrained by its residual
quota supply, i.e., q2 = Q2 = 
   Q1, then we can assume @q2=@q1 = 0 (Cournot) and
therefore @q=@q1 = 1. Similarly,
@q
@Q1
=
@q1
@Q1
+
@q2
@Q1
= 0 +
@q2
@Q1
:
Here, given market clearing in the quota market, a compliant fringe implies @q2=@Q1 =
@Q2=@Q1 =  1, so that @q=@Q1 =  1.
3 Assuming that the fringe is compliant, we have r () = B02 (q2)  p (q)  c02 (q2) and hence @r () =@p (q) = 1.
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If @q=@q1 = 1 and @q=@Q1 =  1, then @q=@q1 + @q=@Q1 = 0 and (20) collapses to
@B1 ()
@q1
= R1 (Q

1) ;
as in the case of a rm with dominance only in the quota market. Although, given a
compliant fringe, Q1 = q

1 implies that the dominant rm has no net e¤ect upon total
industry output (which remains equal to 
), note that only where q1 =

Q1   Q1

> 0
are the rst order conditions equivalent to those for a rm with dominance only in the
quota market (unless Q1 = 0, however, this would imply q1 > Q

1, i.e., cheating). Note,
also, that here we could not have @B1 () =@q1 = R1 (Q1) = 0, since R1 (Q1) = 0 requires
Q1   Q1

< 0.
For an unconstrained solution to the dominant rms problem (q1 R Q1), we require 1 = 0
in the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and hence, from (18) and (19), and given @q=@q1 = 1 and
@q=@Q1 =  1, we have
@B1 ()
@q1
+ p0 (q) q1 = p
0 (q)

Q1   Q1

R 0 (21)
and
r () +

@r ()
@Q1
  p0 (q)
 
Q1   Q1

=  p0 (q) q1 > 0; (22)
where we have rearranged terms in order more clearly to distinguish the marginal impacts
on revenues from output and on revenues from (costs of) quota selling (buying). From
(21) we can see that the optimal net marginal benet of output could now be negative if
it is protable to purchase quota in order to support the output price. In the case where
Q1 = Q1, notice, the dominant rm produces where
@B1 ()
@q1
+ p0 (q) q1 = 0;
which is equivalent to the usual rule for a monopoly producer. At the same time, we would
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have r () =  p0 (q) q1 and hence @B1 () =@q1 = r (), so that total output, although it
may not equal 
, is e¢ ciently produced (given, as before, certain assumptions about the
fringe). Here, the dominant rms initial allocation is such that it does not exercise market
power in the quota market, although it does in the output market. In this case, Hahns
[7] result still holds, even where Q1 < q

1.
From (21) and (22), we can observe that, for an unconstrained solution to the rms
problem, we have the condition
@B1 ()
@q1
= R1 (Q

1) = p
0 (q)

Q1   Q1
  q1 > 0; (23)
where we know that @B1 () =@q1 = R1 (Q1) > 0, since, given r () > 0, R1 (Q1)  0
requires

Q1   Q1

< 0 which would still imply p0 (q)

Q1   Q1
  q1 > 0. Condition
(23) leads directly to
Proposition 1. If a rm has market dominance in both the quota market and the output
market, it may be voluntarily compliant, or even hold excess quota in order to support the
market price for its output, provided that its initial quota endowment is strictly positive.
This holds even if the rm becomes a net purchaser of quota as a result.
Proof. Given p0 (q) < 0, in (23) we require

Q1   Q1
  q1 < 0 and hence Q1   Q1 <
q1. This immediately excludes the possibility that a dominant rm will be compliant when
its initial allocation Q1 is zero, but otherwise Q1  q1 does not now require Q1 > Q1, as
is the case when the dominant rm has market power only in the quota market.
Note that the condition Q1 > 0 ensures that, if the dominant rm is a net purchaser of
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quota, the amount of quota purchased is strictly less than output. Rearranging the RHS
of (23), we can also observe that if the rm is holding excess quota we will always have
[Q1   q1] < Q1;
i.e., the amount of excess quota held (if any) is strictly less than the rms initial allocation.
Proposition 1 contradicts the nding of Anderson [1] that, if the dominant rm were a net
purchaser of quota, it would never be protable for it to restrict its output because any
increase in the price of the marketable output will be transferred into an increase in the
purchase price (of quota) (p.296). Andersons conclusion derives from his assumption
that, in the monopsony case, the rms initial quota allocation was zero so that, as we
have seen, the rm will indeed not hold excess quota. More recently, Anderson [2] revises
this earlier conclusion, although without further formal analysis of the problem.4 As we
have seen, the dominant rm will not freely even match its quota demand to its output
if the initial quota allocation is zero, which we can state as
Corollary 1. If the dominant rms initial quota allocation is zero, it will unambiguously
cheat.
Proof. If Q1 = 0 in (23), we must have Q1 < q

1.
While Q1 < q

1 is the only possible unconstrained solution to (16) if Q1 = 0, however, it is
4 The primary focus of Andersons [2] paper is rather di¤erent to this one. He distinguishes between what he terms
traditional or capacity-basedmarket power and permit-basedmarket power, which he treats separately.
The primary focus of his analysis is then the possibility that one quota-holding rm might nd it protable to
lease the productive capacity of other rms in order to control the market supply of the good (sh).
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also an unconstrained solution if Q1 > 0. If, in (21) and (22), Q1 = 0, then we will have
@B1 ()
@q1
+ p0 (q) q1 = p
0 (q)Q1  0 (24)
and
r () + @r ()
@Q1
Q1 = p
0 (q) [Q1   q1] > 0: (25)
Here, notice, we cannot rule out Q1 > 0 even where r () > 0, i.e., the rm may now
purchase quota even if it is not subject to any enforcement.
In summary, if the initial endowment of quota to the dominant rm is greater than
zero, the rm may choose to withhold quota from the market or to cheat, or indeed to
match quota and output. The outcome will be parameter-specic, depending upon the
relative production capacities of the dominant rm and the competitive fringe as well as
the relative slopes of the consumer inverse demand curve for the industry output and
the (fringe) inverse quota demand curve. If, however, the dominant rms initial quota
allocation is zero, it will unambiguously be non-compliant, although even in the absence
of enforcement the rms quota demand may still be positive. Here, Q1 < q

1 implies that
total output exceeds 
 and hence the output price is lower than if the rm is compliant.
If the rm is non-compliant, on the other hand, we can assume as before that it is
subject to enforcement and expects to incur a penalty for a violation. Then, still letting
@q=@q1 = 1 and @q=@Q1 =  1, for Q1 < q1 we have the rst order conditions
@B1 ()
@q1
+ p0 (q)

q1  

Q1   Q1

=
@1 (v1)
@q1
> 0 (26)
and
R1 (Q

1) + p
0 (q)

q1  

Q1   Q1

=  @1 (v1)
@Q1
> 0; (27)
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and hence
@B1 ()
@q1
= R1 (Q

1) +

@1 (v1)
@q1
+
@1 (v1)
@Q1

> 0;
as we had previously. Again, Hahns [7] result can hold for a non-compliant rm (depend-
ing upon our assumptions about the behaviour of the fringe) if and only if the violation
in the expected penalty function is expressed in level terms, i.e., v1  q1  Q1.
5. A non-compliant fringe
We have so far assumed that the competitive fringe is compliant. We now briey consider
how our analysis of the dominant rms behaviour changes if we relax this assumption.
Non-compliance in the fringe has two e¤ects in our model. Firstly, as noted by Malik [12]
in the context of pollution permits, non-compliance a¤ects the elasticity of the fringes
(inverse) quota demand. In Maliks model, fringe non-compliance renders the fringe rms
permit demands (everywhere) more elastic and hence the fringe inverse demand (every-
where) less elastic. This result does, however, depend upon his modelling of fringe rms
expected penalties as a function of their violations expressed in level terms. If expected
penalties in the fringe are instead expressed as a function of relative violations, the e¤ect
upon the elasticity of quota demand varies with the quota price (see Appendix A). In
this case, non-compliant quota demands are more elastic at relatively low or high quota
prices, but less elastic at intermediate quota prices. A more, rather than less, elastic
fringe inverse quota demand would result in an increase in the dominant rms quota
market monopoly power, rather than the reduction found by Malik.5
5 As a result, Malik [12] nds that there may be net social benets from non-compliance in the fringe. This
would not be the case, however, if the fringe inverse quota demand were to become more, rather than less, elastic
through non-compliance.
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Secondly, in our analysis of a dominant rm with both quota and output market power,
recall that the assumption of a compliant fringe enabled us to assume that @r () =@p (q) =
1 and that @q=@q1 =  @q=@Q1 = 1, so that in the decision rule
@B1 ()
@q1
+ p0 (q)

@q
@q1
+
@r ()
@p (q)
 @q
@Q1
 
q1  

Q1   Q1

= R1 (Q

1) ;
the rst bracketed term on the LHS was equal to zero and the expression collapsed to
@B1 ()
@q1
= R1 (Q

1) ;
as for a rm with quota market power alone.
If expected penalties in a non-compliant fringe are assumed to depend upon the level vio-
lation size, we will still have B02 (q

2) = r () and hence @r () =@p (q) = @B02 (q2) =@p (q) = 1
as before. If expected penalties in the fringe are assumed to depend upon the relative
size of violations, then, as we show in Appendix A, we will have B02 (q

2) < r () and there-
fore we cannot assume that @r () =@p (q) = 1. Nevertheless, we would still expect that
@r () =@p (q) > 0 and hence the sign of @q=@Q1 to be unchanged. Looking now at the
(unconstrained) condition for Q1 written out in full
R1 (Q

1) =  p0 (q)
@q
@Q1

Q1   Q1
  q1 ; (28)
we can see, provided we still have @q=@Q1 = @q2=@Q1 < 0, that R1 (Q1) takes the opposite
sign to

Q1   Q1
  q1. However, it is then apparent that we must have R1 (Q1) >
0 and hence

Q1   Q1
  q1 < 0 as before (since we cannot have R1 (Q1) < 0 and
Q1   Q1
  q1 > 0). If @q2=@Q1 = 0, however, then R1 (Q1) = 0, which again requires
Q1   Q1

< 0 and hence

Q1   Q1
  q1 < 0. A conjectural derivative of @q2=@Q1 > 0,
on the other hand, implies that the dominant rm expects the fringe to increase its output
in response to a decrease in its residual quota supply, which we can dismiss as perverse.
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In the corresponding condition for q1
@B1 ()
@q1
= p0 (q)
@q
@q1

Q1   Q1
  q1 ; (29)
we can therefore assume that

Q1   Q1
  q1 < 0. Here, fringe non-compliance does not
change the resultant positive sign of the expression provided @q2=@q1 >  1. If @q2=@q1 =
 1 (the usual competitive conjecture) then @q=@q1 = 0 and hence @B1 () =@q1 = 0, as
for a dominant rm with no market power in the output market. If @q2=@q1 <  1, on the
other hand, we will have @q=@q1 < 0 and hence @B1 () =@q1 < 0.
In summary, in the case of a dominant rm with both quota and output market power,
fringe non-compliance does not change the sign of

Q1   Q1
  q1 in the conditions
for unconstrained prot maximisation and therefore does not substantially change our
conclusions about the dominant rms behaviour, although at the margins it will a¤ect
the rms choices of q1 and Q

1 (and we can no longer assume @B1 () =@q1 = R1 (Q1) as
before).
6. Conclusion
We have shown that an unconstrained rm with dominance in both quota and output
markets may hold excess quota in order to support the output price, even if it is a net
buyer of quota, provided that its initial quota allocation is non-zero. Even in the absence
of enforcement, therefore, the dominant rm may nd it protable to comply or to over-
comply with its quota rather than to cheat. The outcome is parameter-specic, but the
amount of any excess quota held will be strictly less than the rms initial quota allocation
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(this could provide a general rule of thumbfor the avoidance of output restriction under
quotas). If the rms initial quota allocation is zero, on the other hand, it will always cheat,
although, even in the absence of enforcement, a non-compliant rm may still purchase
some quota.
Hahns [7] e¢ ciency result holds in all cases for both compliant and non-compliant rms
except where expected penalties are not modelled as a function of level violations...
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Appendix A
For a non-compliant price-taking rm, the short run (risk-neutral) expected prot max-
imisation problem is
max
q2;Q2
B2 (q2)  rQ2   2 (v2) s:t: q2  0; Q2  0; (A-1)
where the expected ne 2 (v2) is dened as before. From the Lagrangian, the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for an optimum are
Lq = B02 (q2) 
@2 (v

2)
@q2
 0; q2  0; Lqq2 = 0; (A-2a)
LQ =  r   @2 (v

2)
@Q2
 0; Q2  0; LQQ2 = 0: (A-2b)
If the violation is expressed in level terms, i.e., v2  q2   Q2, then @2 (v2) =@q2 =
 @2 (v2) =@Q2 = 02 (v2) and hence for q2 > Q2 > 0 we have
B02 (q

2) = r;
as for a compliant rm (Malik [11]).
Consider, however, the case where the expected penalty is a function of the rms relative
violation of its quota demand. Thus let v2  q2=Q2, with 002 (v2)  0. For q2 > Q2 > 0,
we then have the rst-order necessary conditions
B02 (q

2) =
@2 (v

2)
@q2
= 02 (v

2)
1
Q2 (r)
(A-3)
and
r =  @2 (v

2)
@Q2
= 02 (v

2)
q2 (r)
Q2 (r)
2 : (A-4)
If we solve (A-3) and (A-4) for 02 (v

2), we can nd the violation ratioidentity
Q2 (r)
q2 (r)
=
B02 (q

2)
r
 1; (A-5)
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which, following Hatcher [8], we will henceforth denote by 2 (r). Here, a value of 

2 (r) =
1 obviously indicates compliance. Given Q2 (r) = 

2 (r) q

2 (r), we can then nd the slope
of the quota demand curve as
dQ2 (r)
dr
= 2 (r)
dq2 (r)
dr
+
Q2 (r)
2 (r)
 d

2 (r)
dr
: (A-6)
Similarly, from B02 (q

2) = 

2 (r) r, we can nd
B002 (q

2)
dq2 (r)
dr
= 2 (r) + r
d2 (r)
dr
;
and hence
dq2 (r)
dr
= B00 12 ()

2 (r) + r
d2 (r)
dr

; (A-7)
where, by the inverse function rule, B00 12 ()  1=B002 (q2) < 0 is the slope of the inverse of
the rms marginal benet in output function B02 (q2). Substituting from (A-7) into (A-6)
we obtain
dQ2 (r)
dr
= B00 12 ()

2 (r)
2 + 2 (r) r
d2 (r)
dr

+
Q2 (r)
2 (r)
 d

2 (r)
dr
: (A-8)
For a compliant fringe rm, notice, 2 (r) = 1 and d

2 (r) =dr = 0 everywhere, so that
(A-8) collapses to
dQ2 (r)
dr
= B00 12 () < 0;
as we would expect.
In order to interpret expression (A-8), we need to be able to sign d2 (r) =dr for a non-
compliant rm. Although, by denition, non-compliance implies that we must have
d2 (r) =dr < 0 around r = 0 (where we assume there is no incentive to cheat and
therefore 2 (r) = 1), we cannot, a priori, be sure about the sign of the derivative as the
quota price increases further. To examine d2 (r) =dr we must turn to the comparative
statics of the problem.
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If we totally di¤erentiate the rst order conditions (A-2a) and (A-2b) with respect to q2,
Q2 and r, we obtain
Lqqdq2 (r) + LqQdQ2 (r) = 0 (A-9)
and
LQqdq2 (r) + LQQdQ2 (r) = dr; (A-10)
which we can rearrange and write in matrix form as Lqq LqQ
LQq LQQ
264 dq

2 (r)
dr
dQ2 (r)
dr
375 =  01

:
Using Cramers Rule, we can then nd
dq2 (r)
dr
=
 LqQ
jHj < 0 (A-11)
and
dQ2 (r)
dr
=
Lqq
jHj < 0; (A-12)
where jHj = LqqLQQ   L2qQ > 0, together with
Lqq = B002 (q2) 
@22 (v

2)
@q22
= B002 (q

2)  002 (v2)
1
Q2 (r)
2 < 0 (A-13)
and
LqQ = LQq =  @
22 (v

2)
@q2@Q2
= 02 (v

2)
1
Q2 (r)
2 + 
00
2 (v

2)
q2 (r)
Q2 (r)
3 > 0: (A-14)
Given 2 (r)  Q2 (r) =q2 (r), it is then straightforward to nd
d2 (r)
dr
=
1
q2 (r)

dQ2 (r)
dr
  2 (r)
dq2 (r)
dr

; (A-15)
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where, using (A-11) and (A-12), we can evaluate the expression in brackets as
Lqq
jHj + 

2 (r)
LqQ
jHj
=
1
jHj

B002 (q

2)  002 (v2)
1
Q2 (r)
2

+ 2 (r)
1
jHj

02 (v

2)
1
Q2 (r)
2 + 
00
2 (v

2)
q2 (r)
Q2 (r)
3

=
1
jHj

B002 (q

2) + 

2 (r) 
0
2 (v

2)
1
Q2 (r)
2

R 0: (A-16)
The sign of (A-15) therefore depends upon the sign of (A-16), in which the rst term
in the bracketed expression is negative while the second term is positive. If, as stated
previously, around r = 0 we have d2 (r) =dr < 0, this implies that here
jB002 (q2)j >
2 (r) 02 (v2) 1Q2 (r)2
 :
Given dQ2 (r) =dr < 0, however, at some higher quota price the quota demand must be
reduced to the point where we have
jB002 (q2)j <
2 (r) 02 (v2) 1Q2 (r)2

and hence d2 (r) =dr > 0, since lim
Q2!0
1=Q2 (r)
2 =1. We can then infer that there is some
intermediate quota price ~r at which d2 (r) =dr = 0, which implies a minimum value of
2 (r) and hence a maximum relative violation. We can, therefore, state
Result A1. When expected penalties are a function of relative quota violations, the
violation rate is initially increasing in the quota price, but reaches a maximum and then
declines as the quota price increases further.
We can now evaluate the slope expression (A-8), rstly at r = 0. Here we assume that
2 (r) = 1 and d

2 (r) =dr < 0, so that
dQ2 (r)
dr

r=0
= B00 12 () +Q2 (r)
d2 (r)
dr
< B00 12 () : (A-17)
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At r = 0, therefore, the non-compliant quota demand curve is more elastic than the
compliant quota demand curve. At some arbitrarily high quota price, Q2 ! 0 and hence
d2 (r) =dr ! +1, so that
dQ2 (r)
dr

Q2=0
= B00 12 ()

2 (r)
2 + r
d2 (r)
dr

< B00 12 () ; (A-18)
i.e., the non-compliant quota demand is again more elastic. However, as we have seen,
there is some intermediate quota price ~r at which 2 (r) < 1 and d

2 (r) =dr = 0 and
hence
dQ2 (r)
dr

r=~r
= B00 12 ()2 (r)2 > B00 12 () :
Here, where the relative violation is at a maximum, the non-compliant quota demand
curve is unambiguously less elastic than that of an otherwise identical compliant rm.
Thus we have
Result A2. When expected penalties are a function of relative quota violations, the non-
compliant quota demand is more elastic than the compliant quota demand at very low or
very high quota prices, but is less elastic at intermediate quota prices.
This contrasts with the nding in Hatcher [8], where it was implicitly assumed, erro-
neously, that d2 (r) =dr = 0 everywhere and hence non-compliant quota demands were
always less elastic.
Result A2 implies that the non-compliant quota demand curve intersects the compliant
quota demand curve, as suggested by Hatcher [8]. We can examine this by introducing
a parameter (or state variable)  to represent the regulators enforcement e¤ort, so that
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2  2 (v2; ). We then assume that increasing , all else equal, increases the slope of
the expected penalty function, i.e., @02 () =@ > 0. Now, if we totally di¤erentiate the
rst order conditions with respect to q2, Q2 and , we obtain
Lqqdq2 () + LqQdQ2 () =
@02 ()
@
 1
Q2 ()
d (A-19)
and
LQqdq2 () + LQQdQ2 () =  
@02 ()
@
 q

2 ()
Q2 ()2
d; (A-20)
which we can rewrite in matrix form as
 Lqq LqQ
LQq LQQ
2664
dq2 ()
d
dQ2 ()
d
3775 =
26664
@02 ()
@
 1
Q2 ()
 @
0
2 ()
@
 q

2 ()
Q2 ()2
37775 :
By Cramers Rule we can then nd
dQ2 ()
d
=
 Lqq @
0
2 ()
@
 q

2 ()
Q2 ()2
  LqQ@
0
2 ()
@
 1
Q2 ()
jHj
=  @
0
2 ()
@
 q

2 ()
Q2 ()2
 [Lqq + 

2 ()LqQ]
jHj ; (A-21)
where, from (A-15),
[Lqq + 2 ()LqQ]
jHj =
dQ2 (r)
dr
  2 (r)
dq2 (r)
dr
R 0:
Given @02 () =@ > 0, we can see that dQ2 () =d always takes the opposite sign to
d2 () =dr. Where the violation rate is increasing in the quota price, therefore, increasing
enforcement increases quota demand, but where the violation rate is decreasing in the
quota price, increasing enforcement reduces quota demand. Where the violation rate is
unchanging in the quota price, increasing enforcement has no e¤ect upon quota demand,
which implies that here the non-compliant quota demand must equal the compliant quota
demand. This represents a proof of the result found by Hatcher [8], which we can restate
as
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Result A3. (Hatcher)With expected penalties for quota non-compliance dependent upon
relative violations, the quota demand of a non-compliant rm exactly coincides with that
of an otherwise identical compliant rm at the quota price at which the non-compliant
rms relative violation rate is at a maximum. At lower quota prices, the non-compliant
quota demand is lower, but at higher quota prices the non-compliant quota demand is
higher than that of an otherwise identical compliant rm.
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